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Abstract
Some previous studies have suggested that competition regimes can destroy
shareholder value. This study examines data on 50 mergers in the UK between 1989
and 2002. The study confirms the finding from earlier studies of greater gains to
shareholders in target than bidding companies, but does not find evidence supporting
overall loss of shareholder value to target company shareholders when a merger is
prohibited. It finds evidence that when the regulatory regime is stable and well
understood the capital market behaves efficiently in response to new information.
However, for a sub group of the mergers involving companies with a new regulatory
regime, of which industry and the market had little or no experience with respect to
mergers, the capital market operated less efficiently.
Key words: mergers, competition policy, shareholder value, event study, privatised
industries.
3Introduction
Previous studies have pointed to possible significant costs to the economy arising
from state regulation (for a review see Blundell and Robinson, 2000). These costs take
the form of the administrative costs of operating the regulatory system and the
compliance costs to the company resulting from a competition inquiry in the form of
legal and other advisory expenses and management time. However, these costs can be
expected to be de minimis in relation to a company’s value; typically such costs in the
UK amount per merger to between £500,000 and £2m. Hence, they are not the subject
of this paper. A potentially much more important impact on shareholder value will
result from the City revaluing the share price during an inquiry. Some previous
studies have found that competition regimes can lead through share price movements
to substantial losses to shareholders. This paper considers the impact of UK
competition policy on shareholder value between 1989 and 2002. The purpose of the
paper is not to measure the wider social welfare effects of competition policy, which
would take into account the impact on consumers, suppliers, employees etc, but rather
to concentrate on shareholder value, which is one part of social welfare. The effect of
competition policy on shareholder value is an important subject for managers, who
need to manage shareholder expectations during a competition inquiry, and investors.
The UK introduced its competition regime in 1948 with the establishment of the
Monopolies Commission. In 1965 its remit was widened to inquire into mergers as
well as monopoly markets (Wilks, 1999). Under the Competition Act of 1998, the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) became the Competition Commission
(CC) and the powers of the Commission and the government department responsible
for administering competition law, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), were amended.
Under the Enterprise Act 2002 the CC’s decisions became determinative, that is to say
they became final subject only to legal appeal. Previously the CC and before it the
MMC had made recommendations to the Minister. In addition, the Act changed the
test for mergers from “the public interest” (under Section 84 of the Fair Trading Act
1973) to “a substantial lessening of competition” test. In practice, however, since the
41980s the Commission’s reports have tended to concentrate upon a merger’s
competitive effects.1
The UK has a long-standing competition regime. In principle, over time the capital
market should have built up experience of competition policy in the UK, allowing it to
predict with some degree of confidence the likelihood of a referral to the MMC/CC
and the MMC/CC’s decision in the case of any referred merger. A reasonably stable
and predictable competition regime should reduce distorting effects on share prices
resulting from unexpected decisions by the competition authorities. Like a good tax
system, a competition regime should achieve its goals, of preventing a lessening of
competition, while minimising the costs, including costs imposed through share price
movements in the stock market. Hence, in this paper we consider the impact on
shareholder value of mergers referred to the MMC/CC between 1989 and 2002. This
period was chosen because certain earlier studies, discussed below, had looked at
competition policy and shareholder value up until the early 1990s and because the
competition regime in the UK was changed substantially by the 2002 Enterprise Act,
which took effect from June 2003.
During the study period of 1989-2002 the legal framework of competition regulation
was based on the Fair Trading Act 1973 modified through the Competition Acts 1980
and 1998. However these did not change the concepts of qualifying mergers or the
“public interest” test. The market share threshold for qualifying cases has remained
constant at 25% since 1973, and the asset size threshold was £30m from 1984, rising
to £70m in 1994. Hence there was a period of stability in the legislative framework
governing competition regulation during the period 1989-2002. This regime had also
existed for 15 years by the start of the study period, encompassing over 3200
qualifying cases of which 98 cases were referred for inquiry. As a result, the UK
competition regime should have been a reasonably certain and well-understood
regime during the study period.
1 One of the authors is a Member of the Competition Commission. However, all comments made in
this paper are made in a personal capacity. We would like to thank two referees and Sudi Sudarsanam ,
Paul Geroski and participants of a special session on mergers and acquisitions at the British Academy
of Management Conference in September 2004, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
5The study period, however, contains a number of merger cases involving companies
from industries in which new, sector-specific regulators were created, namely in
water, electricity and telecommunications. The regulatory regimes for these industries
were new, and the role of the CC/MMC had been modified to work with the industry
specific regulators on competition issues relating to these industries. Therefore,
merger cases involving companies from these industries may not have benefited to the
same degree from regime stability and being well understood. One new aspect of their
regulation was the roles played by the two regulators – the CC/MMC and the sector-
specific regulators, such as OFTEL - and how far their responsibilities intertwined and
overlapped. In the discussion below, for convenience, we refer to these industries as
‘privatised industries’, although in some cases, while subject to dual regulation, the
firms concerned had not been privatised. Also, a number of the privatised industries
had large numbers of small shareholders and it is possible that this may have impacted
on the way the stock market responded to mergers.
The prime focus of the research is to understand any cost to shareholders arising from
share price movements when companies desire to merge and the merger leads to a
formal competition inquiry. It is therefore in the tradition of earlier studies, especially
by Wier (1983), Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994). Consistent with the
usage in competition policy, we use the term merger to include both friendly and
hostile takeover bids.
In the case of any merger the view the capital market takes about the likelihood of a
competition inquiry and the likely decision of the MMC/CC will be reflected in the
share price, in addition to any view taken about the intrinsic value of the merger itself.
We study the mergers from the time they are publicly announced, encompassing the
time from the announcement of the merger to a decision by the government to refer
the merger to the MMC/CC for inquiry. The period ends when a decision is made by
the government following the MMC/CC findings as to whether the merger should be
prohibited or not, perhaps subject to behavioural or structural remedies, or when the
merger is abandoned.2
2 Before 2003 the MMC (later CC) reported to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industries, who had
discretion not to accept the Commission’s recommendation in the case of an adverse finding.
6While the capital market cannot be expected to predict the outcome of each stage of
the inquiry process with perfect accuracy, the experience of investors should lead
them to assess the likely outcomes for each merger. The capital market will form a
collective view of the probability of referral to the Commission and concerning the
Commission’s final decision. Some evidence discussed below suggests that a
competition regulator’s decisions may be unexpected or differ from those anticipated
by the capital market, but given rational expectations by investors, there should be no
tendency towards systematic bias in the capital market’s judgement. Competition
regimes facing political interference might well be prone to an unexpected outcome,
although in the UK the MMC/CC has operated with a high degree of independence
(Wilks, 1999). Investors may also be expected to find it more difficult to forecast
outcomes where mergers relate to industries where there is little or no track record of
mergers or where there is a greater likelihood of non-competition issues influencing a
regulator’s decision. Good examples in the UK of the former are the privatised
utilities, notably water and electricity, and of the latter the communications sector,
where the government takes a particular interest in merger outcomes because of the
possible effects on diversity in the media. In the 1990s these sectors were subject to a
number of merger bids.
The paper contributes to an understanding of the costs of regulation and more
especially competition policy. Whether competition policy increases social welfare
depends on the improvements in economic efficiency it achieves, compared with its
administrative and compliance costs including the impact on shareholder returns. The
study’s conclusions are also consistent with the importance for public policy of
having a consistent and predictable competition policy. This is an important finding
given that the number of countries with competition laws has increased from around
30 to over 90 in the last ten years (Singh, 2002). Where countries introduce new
competition laws, they should expect that the impact of a competition inquiry on
shareholder value may be greater than we find for the UK, because investors will lack
experience of how the competition law is to be applied and therefore larger abnormal
returns (both positive and negative) are to be expected. The next two sections of the
paper review the existing literature in the field and detail the research method. The
empirical results are then presented and discussed. The paper concludes by
summarising the main findings and the contribution of the research to an
7understanding of the relationship between competition policy and shareholder value.
Directions for future research are also highlighted.
Literature review
Most of the research into mergers has concentrated upon the effects on firm
performance, measured mainly in terms of profitability, productivity and the impact
on share prices. Profitability studies tend to show negative effects from mergers,
while productivity and event studies tend to show more positive effects. For example,
Meeks (1977) studied the effects of mergers in the UK on firm profitability. Meeks
concluded that between a half and two-thirds of the firms in his UK sample suffered a
fall in profits after a merger. Sirower (1997) studied stock market prices in US
mergers. He found strong support for a negative relationship between the level of
premium paid and the acquiring firms’ performance. A flow of studies since has
produced the following conclusions. While around a half or more of mergers fail to
achieve the expected economic synergies, shareholders in target firms are likely to
benefit more than shareholders in bidding firms (for a review of the earlier literature,
see Chiplin and Wright, 1988, pp. 66-73, for later studies, see Sirower, 1997,
Appendix A, pp. 145-166). This is because bidders may overestimate the economic
gains from a merger and because of the level of premium they pay to shareholders in
the target firm to win their acceptance of the takeover bid. Other studies have begun
to look at mergers in terms of management and organisational changes, with a view to
predicting the type of internal restructuring that should take place post merger if
economic gains are to be maximised (for a review of this literature, see Schweiger and
Goulet, 2000). By contrast, there seems to have been much less research into the
interaction between competition policy and the economic consequences of mergers.
Important exceptions are the studies by Eckbo (1983), Stillman (1983), Wier (1983),
Franks and Harris (1993), Forbes (1994), Brady and Feinberg (2000), Aktas, de Bodt
and Roll (2001), and Duso, Nevan and Roeller (2003), which we now review.
In 1983 Eckbo carried out event studies on a sample of 259 horizontal and vertical
mergers in the USA, of which 79 were challenged by the government’s anti-trust
8agencies. He found that there was no statistical evidence from rival company share
price movements to support a collusive behaviour hypothesis for horizontal mergers.
From this he concluded that horizontal mergers challenged by regulators had been
based on cost saving efficiencies and not market power, and they were no more
damaging to competition than vertical mergers. In the same year Stillman (1983)
carried out a similar study of 11 horizontal mergers involving US companies between
1964 and 1972 which were challenged by the antitrust enforcement agencies. His
results were consistent with those of Eckbo (1983). Both found a lack of statistical
evidence to support referral to the anti-trust authorities on competition grounds.
Research closer to our study is that by Wier (1983). Wier looked at the costs of
defending mergers challenged by the US anti-trust enforcement agencies. Again using
event studies, she considered the effects on market capitalisation measured by
abnormal returns at key events in the regulatory process. Her finding was that, on
average, merger complaint announcements occasion abnormal losses and large costs
are born by shareholders of target firms if proposed mergers are cancelled. Wealth
gains earned at the time of the bid announcement were cancelled out by losses by the
time the competition inquiry ended. But she concluded that the effects on share prices
will also be influenced by the ability of investors to accurately predict competition
policy outcomes.
The relevant studies for the UK are those by Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes
(1994). Using event studies and data from a sample of 159 UK mergers referred to the
MMC between 1965 and 1990, Franks and Harris (1993) examined evidence of
shareholder value changes to bidder and target companies in mergers. They identified
substantial losses to shareholders when the MMC rejected merger bids. In addition,
they found that negative value returns occurred on referral and on the announcement
of an adverse public interest finding by the MMC. Announcement of a favourable
decision had a small positive effect. The value effects were greater and statistically
significant for the target company, while the bidder company returns were smaller and
statistically insignificant. They also found that a MMC rejection of a merger led to a
substantial reduction in the gains to the target company’s shareholders that had been
recorded at the date of the merger bid.
9Forbes (1994) investigated the value impact of MMC references using event studies
of 53 mergers in the period 1976 to 1990, although for bidding companies only.
Abnormal returns were calculated for the initial announcement of the merger,
announcement of referral to the MMC by the Minister, and the Commission’s
decision. The value effects were found to be broadly consistent with those in Franks
and Harris (1993). Bidder returns were again small and not statistically significant.
More recently there has been an attempt to look at the impact on shareholder value of
EU competition regulation. Brady and Feinberg (2000) examined 20 mergers from
1991 to 1995 subjected to EU competition investigation, after the introduction of the
EU’s merger regulations in 1990. This was the first time that the EU had taken formal
powers to challenge mergers. They looked for evidence of regime effects (relating to
cases grouped by EU member state and by industry sectors) and individual case
effects of regulatory decisions on shareholder value. They found that the regime
effects were weak. However, for individual cases enforcement of the merger
regulations could have a substantial effect on individual company share prices. They
also discovered that findings by the European Commission of “serious doubts” or the
announcement of a “suspension” decision adversely affected the share price. In this
case, the fact that investors seem to have had difficulty predicting inquiry outcomes,
as reflected in share price movements, probably related to the fact that the merger
regime in the EU was new. Another study, by Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2001),
looking at whether EU competition policy was biased against mergers involving non-
EU firms, found clear confirmation that investors anticipate regulatory intervention.
Hence, abnormal returns around the bid announcement date must be interpreted in the
light of the probability and cost of regulatory intervention. Duso, Nevan and Roeller
(2003) discovered a similar effect on competitors’ share prices, drawing on the
method proposed by Eckbo (1983) and Stillman (1983). They posited an anti-
competitive merger would reduce competitive market forces within an industry and
reduce downward pressure on prices and profit margins, which would be viewed
positively by industry investors resulting in increased share prices for competitors.
Hence a positive movement in competitors’ share prices is interpreted as a view in the
capital market that the merger is anti-competitive. From this they identified instances
where the European Commission’s findings on mergers may have been in error.
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The existing literature suggests, therefore, that alongside the costs to shareholders of
firms defending anti-trust inquiries, in terms of professional fees and management
resources, costs may be imposed on shareholders by the uncertainty of regulatory
outcomes. In this paper we consider whether there is evidence since 1989 to support
the findings of Wier (1983), Franks and Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994). All three
observed a cost to shareholders of companies going through either the US and UK
competition regulation processes. This cost arose from abnormal losses incurred on
decision announcements, and in particular shareholders of target companies suffered a
significant loss when an acquisition was prevented. We also consider whether there
are any groupings of firms where stock market prices may have reacted in a different
way to competition policy decisions than share prices in other mergers.
Research Method
In this paper event study techniques are used to examine 50 merger cases referred to
the MMC/CC between 1989 and 2002. The mergers are listed in table 1 and were
chosen from the Competition Commission’s (incorporating the MMC’s) list of merger
cases on the basis of both bidder and target companies being listed on a public stock
exchange for at least one year before the announcement of the bid3. Dates for events
were found from company, Competition Commission and Stock Exchange press
releases and from The Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. Event dates were
confirmed from at least two sources if the original press releases were not available.
Daily company share prices and market indices were obtained from DataStream. The
final column of table 1 indicates those companies falling into the ‘privatised
industries’ grouping (denoted by letter P). The remaining mergers fall into the ‘other
industries’ category of the analysis. The table also shows the merger outcome, the
regulatory decision by the competition authorities and whether the merger involved
any competitive bidding; all of this data are used in the analysis below.
3 Between 1989 and 2002 a total of 156 merger cases were referred to CC/MMC. Of these, in 50 cases
both target and bidder companies were listed on stock exchanges, allowing analysis using event study
methods in this research.
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(Table 1 here)
A market model was estimated using OLS regression comparing each company’s
daily share price changes (bidder and target) against changes in a major index for the
stock exchange on which the companies were quoted (i.e. FTSE All Share index for
UK listed companies). The model estimation period was from one calendar year
before the bid announcement to two days before the final event. The final event was
either the date of the completion of the merger deal in the Stock Market (either formal
close of deal or the deal declared unconditional) or abandonment or prohibition of the
bid. The estimation period was chosen so that the market model would reflect the
variable and extended period between the initial bid and the final event, which can be
up to a year in some cases. Event windows were excluded from the estimation of the
market model. In this study the event windows were set at three days because this
period should encompass immediate lead and lag effects4, while restricting the
possibility of including share price changes resulting from events exogenous to the
regulatory process. Setting a longer event window risks introducing effects on the
share price that are independent of the announcement, including so-called
“confounding” events in event studies.
For each bidder and target company the market model was estimated as follows:
itmtimiit RR  
where itR represents the return on security i on day t, i is a constant, mtR represents
the return on the market portfolio for day t, im is the regression coefficient of the
relationship between security i and the market index, and it represents a random
error term. Dummy values were used to remove event window days from the
estimation regression.5 The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return
and the expected return, and for any security, i, at time t, ARit, is:
 mtimiitit RRAR  
4 To consider the effect of a regulatory or bid announcement on the share price on the day of the
announcement only would exclude any effect on share prices resulting from lead effects (rumours,
stock market anticipation of the announcement content) and lag effects (time for the market to
assimilate the full likely effect on the share price of the announcement).
5 Between the initial bid and the final event there are a number of event windows. These are excluded
from the estimation data for the market model covering the period from one year before the initial bid
to two days before the final event.
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The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for event windows and the total bid was
calculated by summing the daily abnormal returns:

T
itiT ARCAR
0
where CARiT is the cumulative abnormal return for security i over event window T.
Average cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) across n firms is:
n
CAR
ACAR
n
i
it
 1
All event windows were examined for confounding events occurring around the event
period. In most cases event windows were clear of other potentially price sensitive
announcements. In some cases, for example where a company was involved in
multiple bids or other major company activities were ongoing, events sometimes
overlapped. In such cases a judgement was made on the basis of whether the
overlapping event was related to the merger being examined or not. If it was
considered to be related, the event would be included in the abnormal return
calculation, otherwise it was excluded.
The statistical significance testing for the ARs and CARs is discussed in depth in
Salinger (1992), which shows the variance of the CAR is given by:
   



















 

m
m
T
m
it rUVar
r
T
r
T
U
T
TCARVar
2
0
2 1
where T and U are the lengths of the event window and estimation periods
respectively, 2 is the variance of it , mr and  mrVar are the mean and variance of
the market return over the estimation period, and Tmr 0 is the continuously compounded
market return over the event window.
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The test statistic used is t = CAR/ Var (CAR). When the degrees of freedom are large
(e.g. greater than 200) this approximates to a normal distribution and Ztv  , where
v is the degrees of freedom.
When n firms are averaged the test statistic for the averaged group is calculated as:
n
Z
Z
n
i
i
ACAR

 1 ,
where iZ is the Z statistic for individual firms, and n is the number of firms in the
group.
In some cases competitive bids for the same target were considered by the MMC/CC.
These may have been on the basis of either one or both bidders being referred to the
Commission. In all cases of multiple bidders, separate cases were analysed for each
bidder.
Figure 1 summarises the process and the relevant decision points in UK competition
policy and table 2 lists the possible outcomes from a referral. As a merger case
progresses through the process, it is to be expected that the stock market takes a view
on the probability of possible regulatory outcomes, drawing on investors’ and their
advisers’ knowledge of competition law, past regulatory experience and case specifics
(including expert opinion, media comment, rumours, etc). For example, the grounds
on which a merger might be referred are covered by legislation and are well known
and past decisions of the MMC/CC are public knowledge. Table 3 summarises the
merger activity between 1989 and 2002. Of a total of 9872 bids reported to the OFT,
3165 met the Fair Trading Act qualifying terms (either over 25% of market share for
the combination or target assets greater than the prevailing limit of £30m, later raised
to £70m). The OFT referred a total of 156 cases for investigation by the MMC/CC, of
which 22 were subsequently prohibited outright after the Commission’s inquiry.
(Figure 1 and Tables 2 and 3 here.)
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The starting point for the process is the announcement of the merger bid. In a simple
case, the bidding company will usually offer to buy the target at a premium over the
market price prevailing just before the bid announcement. The market will respond,
re-valuing bidder and target companies based on the expected economic effects of the
merger and the probable outcome of the bid. As part of the process, the City will take
account of the possibility of referral to the MMC/CC and will factor in an estimation
of the probable outcome of an inquiry. After referral, as a case moves through the
inquiry process the market will re-evaluate the merging companies at each step of the
process as possible outcomes turn into certainties; for example, the probability of an
adverse finding becomes 1 when the MMC/CC’s decision is published (prior to that
the probability lies in the range >0 to <1). If the merger is laid aside6 or abandoned by
the companies involved part way through the process, the market will also re-value
the companies based on this outcome. In the analysis below, the event study is based
on daily percentage share price changes for the companies, allowing a direct
comparison with the earlier work by Wier (1983), Franks and Harris (1993) and
Forbes (1994), reviewed above.
If the regulatory regime is consistent and well understood by investors, efficient
market behaviour can be expected to predominate. Investors will estimate the future
value of the bidder and target companies, taking account of the nature of the proposed
merger deal and the regulatory uncertainty that surrounds the merger. Efficient market
behaviour in this discussion is intended to mean prices will respond quickly to new
information and be linked to the fundamental value implicit in the announcement or
regulatory “event”. The fundamental value can be considered to be the NPV of the
benefit (or detriment) arising from the event.
By contrast, the regulatory regime may not be so predictable if it is new or its legal
framework undergoes significant changes, as in the study by Brady and Feinberg
(2000) of European merger policy reviewed above. Newness and changes are
accompanied by a lack of case history, making it more difficult for investors to predict
accurately competition authority behaviour. In this situation, investors have more
6 “Laid aside” is the term used to describe MMC/CC inquiries that are stopped because the bidding
party withdraws its bid after referral to the MMC/CC. The inquiries are technically “laid aside” and not
abandoned because they are resurrected if the bid is later renewed.
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difficulty in assessing the possible regulatory outcome and the impact on the
fundamental value of the events announced. In this climate of increased uncertainty,
investors may turn to rumour, belief-based valuations or herd instinct, which may not
be strongly linked to fundamental value.
There is ongoing debate about whether capital markets behave efficiently or not. A
considerable amount of work has taken place to support the Efficient Market
Hypothesis (EMH), as discussed in Fama (1969, 1970, 1991, and 1998). However,
there has also been a strong challenge to the EMH view in the form of a development
of an understanding of inefficient markets and behavioural finance. An overview of
the subject area is given in Shiller (1989, 2001) and in Schleifer (2000). In this
literature, the EMH does not appear to offer an adequate explanation of some
commonly observed features of stock markets, particularly market volatility and the
phenomenon of market bubbles, when prices become detached from the underlying
fundamental values for a period before falling back. Our analysis simply requires that
share prices reflect investors’ current views of competition policy outcomes.
The study period in this paper - 1989 to 2002 - represents a period when the UK
competition regime was relatively stable and well understood. Therefore, we would
expect evidence in the mergers studied to support the proposition that the market
behaved efficiently. However, there is a sub-set of the cases in the study that includes
newly privatised industries, where the regulatory regime was new and involved
sector-specific industry regulators as well as the MMC/CC. In these industries the
OFT, the MMC/CC and the industry regulators could all play a part in deciding the
outcome of any proposed merger. These ‘privatisation’ merger cases therefore entered
relatively untested territory regarding the inter-working between industry regulators
and the competition regulator in the study period. Another cause of additional
uncertainty involved how structural changes in the privatised industries resulting from
mergers might be viewed by government and to what degree government might
intervene in competition decisions, for example by bringing pressure to bear on the
sector regulators. For these reasons, the ‘privatisation’ sub-sample can be considered
to be covered by a new regulatory regime with no or very little case history. Greater
difficulty on the part of investors in understanding and valuing any merger events
might therefore be expected and so we might expect to find some evidence of
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different market behaviour in this sub group. A further factor that might have
impacted on the way the stock market responded to some mergers lies in the large
numbers of small shareholders who purchased shares in privatised companies at the
time of their privatisation. Such shareholders may lack the understanding of
competition law and practice held by more seasoned investors and those with access
to specialist advice.
To test for such effects, for part of the analysis the merger cases studied were split
into two sub-groupings. The first contains the cases involving companies in what we
term the ‘privatised industries’ and the second contains all the other merger cases
studied, which is termed the ‘other industries’ panel. The propositions to be tested
relate to how well market prices reflect the underlying value of the merger events on
the companies, and are as follows.
Proposition 1. In merger cases where the deal is prohibited by the regulator or
abandoned by the companies, the value change arising from bid specific events to the
target company, from bid announcement to bid abandoned, is expected to be zero.
This proposition follows from the fact that, leaving aside the de minimis costs to
companies (in relation to their values) of taking part in MMC/CC inquiries, because
the merger is not completed the competition regime should have no effect on the
fundamental value of companies, as reflected in their share prices. In effect, following
the failed merger the fundamental value of the target company is restored to what it
was immediately before the bid (ignoring, of course, other factors impacting on the
share price since the bid was announced unrelated to the bid, such as tax changes or
changes in the competitive environment). This is because any economic advantages
resulting from the merger factored into the share price by investors in the target
company at the time of the merger bid is removed once the bid is prevented or
abandoned.7
7 A referee pointed out, correctly, that it is possible that because a merger bid puts a firm ‘in play’ by
attracting attention to it as a potential takeover target the management may be ‘shaken up’ and the City
may expect further bids. If such considerations affect the share price after a prohibition or abandonment
of the original bid, then the proposition might not hold true. In this case, the abnormal return results
will not be consistent with the proposition. In fact, our results are generally consistent with the
proposition except for the ‘privatised’ industries, where other issues seem to impact on the way the
share prices behave.
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Proposition 2. In merger cases where the deal is allowed (but not conditionally
allowed) the value change arising from bid specific events to the target company from
bid to deal close is greater than zero.
This proposition is valid because the share prices of target companies tend to rise in
merger bids due to the bid premium required to induce investors to sell their shares in
the target to the bidder. When the merger is permitted by the competition authorities,
this gain is not offset by a counter move in the share price (as in the case of prohibited
and abandoned bids).
Both propositions are applied to the target companies only for two reasons. Firstly the
value of the bid to target company shareholders is driven by the bid premium and is
usually positive in value. When the bid is withdrawn due to prohibition or
abandonment, the value to target company shareholders disappears. This argument
does not apply to the bidder company where the value to its shareholders is based on
the difference between benefits from the bid and the cost of the bid including the
premium paid, as viewed by the capital markets. This may be positive, negative or
zero depending on the circumstances and the views taken (Sirower, 1997). Secondly
target company returns are larger and statistically more significant than returns for
bidder companies.
The Empirical Results
Firstly we establish the abnormal returns arising in each of the 50 merger cases
studied between 1989 and 2002. These results are presented in Table 4. We then test
for the two Propositions relating market behaviour. These results are presented in
Tables 5 and 6.
In section A of table 4 the abnormal return results for all of the mergers studied are
summarised, irrespective of the OFT decision on a referral and the outcome of a
MMC/CC inquiry. As can be seen, target company returns were greater than those for
bidder companies and returns for the “other industries” group were greater than for
the “privatised industries” group. Taking all the cases together, a small positive but
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statistically non-significant overall gain to shareholders of 1.0% for the bidder
companies compares to a much larger and statistically significant gain of 14.3% for
shareholders of the target companies. The finding that target company shareholders
benefit most during mergers is consistent with much of the earlier merger literature
(Sudarsanam, 2003, chapter 4).
(Table 4 here.)
Comparing industry groupings, section A of table 4 also shows that the overall results
for bidder company cases in the ‘privatised industries’ grouping is a small loss (-
2.9%), which is statistically significant at the 1% level, compared to a small but not
statistically significant gain of 2.2% in the ‘other industries’ grouping. By comparison
target companies in both groups made significant positive returns of 8.3% and 16.2%
for the ‘privatised’ and ‘other’ groups, respectively (both statistically significant at the
1% level).
In section B of table 4 cases are grouped by the regulatory decisions of the OFT
(“waived through”) and MMC/CC (the other cases considered by the OFT, i.e. which
were referred to the MMC/CC, and were then later “allowed”, “conditionally
allowed” or “prohibited”). Also, the results when mergers were “laid aside”
(abandoned) are included. Again target companies do better than bidders, irrespective
of the inquiry decision. For bidders, taking all cases together, conditionally allowed
cases showed the greatest return (7.1%) while prohibited cases showed the lowest (-
6.7%), both being statistically significant. Overall bidder returns for other outcomes
were small (-1.8% to 1.4%) and not statistically significant. For target companies,
returns were greater than for bidder companies and statistically significant for all
decisions except laid aside cases. Highest returns for target companies were for
allowed cases (20.7%) and the least was for prohibited cases (4.8%). Not surprisingly,
prohibited outcomes gave the worst returns for both bidder and target companies, and
the pattern was repeated when cases were divided into industry groups.
Particularly interesting are the abnormal returns where target companies are from
what we refer to as ‘privatised’ (sector specific regulated) industries. Where a
prohibition decision was announced following a MMC/CC inquiry, companies in
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these industries displayed the greatest negative abnormal returns of any decision
announcement. Target companies in privatised industries returned a large statistically
significant 12.6% loss, compared to a 0.4% (non-significant) gain in the case of
prohibition announcements for target companies in the ‘other industries’ group (see
table 4, section B, prohibited results, “Decision CAR”). The finding of a negative
abnormal return for target companies on the announcement of a merger prohibition
decision broadly agrees with the findings in the studies by Wier (1983), Franks and
Harris (1993) and Forbes (1994).
However, a finding of negative returns on the announcement of a prohibition decision
does not alone provide a sufficiently accurate picture of the overall effects of a
competition inquiry. When we consider the overall return for target companies in
cases with prohibited decisions, the return is 4.8% and this is made up of a statistically
significant 5.4% return for the privatised industry group of firms and a 3.2% non-
significant return for the ‘other industries’ category (table 4, section B, prohibited
results, “Overall CAR”). This finding is therefore greatly influenced by the privatised
industry cases and is not consistent with the results in Wier (1983). She found an
abnormal loss to shareholders of target companies due to prohibition resulting from
competition inquiries and argued that the result is an additional cost of defending an
anti-trust action in addition to normal legal and professional costs incurred. However
our study agrees with Franks and Harris (1993), finding a gain to target company
shareholders in prohibited cases over the whole bid and inquiry period. Our study
suggests that there is no additional cost to target company shareholders when the
regulatory process is taken as a whole, namely from announcement of a merger bid,
through referral to the MMC/CC, to the inquiry decision prohibiting the merger.
Especially when the privatised industry cases are excluded, the abnormal return is
small and not statistically significant.
By contrast, bidder company shareholders experienced a significant loss in prohibited
cases. Table 4 section B “prohibited” shows the overall bidder loss of -6.7% was
experienced equally in both the “privatised” and “other” industry groups (-6.5% and -
7.1% respectively), all abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 5% level or
better. Interestingly, this overall loss to bidder company shareholders in prohibited
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cases agrees with the figure of -6% in Franks and Harris (1993), though their result
was not statistically significant.
Other results in table 4 covering decisions to allow the mergers to proceed, that is to
say the “allowed”, “conditionally allowed” and “waived through” results, are also of
interest. The abnormal returns to bidder and target companies show slightly different
patterns. In the case of all mergers (privatised and ‘other industries’ together), for
target companies the greatest returns were where there was an “allowed” decision
(20.7%). Bidder returns were highest for “conditionally allowed” cases (7.1%), the
two other decision groups show only small, statistically non significant returns. Again
this is in broad agreement with Franks and Harris (1993) which showed cases allowed
to proceed having returns for target and bidder companies of 38% and 6%,
respectively, over the whole bid and inquiry period.
While table 4 shows some differences between the returns for “privatised” and
“other” industries, it is not possible to examine if market mispricing, due to a
reduction of market efficiency, was a factor in those differences. Therefore, our study
examines this directly by testing target companies returns against Propositions 1 and 2
described earlier. Table 5 shows the results of for the direct tests of Propositions 1 and
2.
In these tests any abnormal return results not significant at the 5% level (two tailed)
are interpreted as being equivalent to zero, in an attempt to ensure that any differences
we find are statistically robust. The cases are again grouped into ‘privatised’ and
‘other industries’ categories. It can be seen that there is a much higher number of
cases with a false result in the ‘privatised’ group. In order to test if the difference
between the two industry groups is statistically significant, the results in table 5 are
summarised in a contingency table, table 6. Applying Fisher’s exact test to the
contingency table indicates the difference between the two groups is statistically
significant at the 10% level. From this finding we can conclude that the market
behaviour in the ‘others’ grouping is more consistent with our Propositions, based on
an efficient, well-informed capital market responding to merger inquiries, than is the
case for the ‘privatised’ group of mergers.
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Merger cases involving ‘privatised’ industries occurred during the 1990s; in
particular, there were three proposed mergers in both the water industry8 and in the
electricity sector and two in communications. During this period investors’ experience
of how the competition authorities would respond to mergers in these sectors
remained limited because there were few, if any, previous cases from which to draw
lessons. It is to be expected, therefore, that investors would have had more difficulty
in accurately assessing the likely impact of regulatory outcomes at each stage of the
mergers involving water, electricity and communications companies. Moreover, the
communications, water and electricity industries had their own, additional, sector-
specific regulators, which can be expected to have added to regulatory uncertainty at
the time of mergers. The sector regulators police competition policy alongside the
MMC/CC and are important in recommending referrals of mergers to the MMC/CC.
After referral they provide evidence to the Commission. The sector-specific regulators
were mainly young in the 1990s9 and at the time no one knew how far the regulators
would allow the industrial structure established in water and electricity at privatisation
to be changed. The government also took a special interest in mergers involving
communications companies because of concerns about media ownership. Our
findings are consistent with the view that less efficient market pricing of shares may
have occurred in the case of mergers in these sectors as views in the stock market
changed about the possible outcomes while the regulatory process relating to mergers
was underway.
A further factor may have influenced market behaviour, which relates to the degree of
non-institutional shareholding in privatised companies. At privatisation, the
government had an objective of increasing the number of private shareholders in the
UK and used the flotation of former state-owned industries to help achieve this aim. A
large degree of equity held by individuals may have reduced the effectiveness of
arbitrage traders in the capital market. At the same time, the behaviour of private
shareholders may have been driven more by shareholder sentiment than by rational
decisions based on fundamental value. With a combination of these factors we might
expect a high degree of non-institutional shareholding to reduce market efficiency, in
8 One of which was conditionally allowed and is therefore not included in table 5.
9 The communications sector now has one regulator in the UK, Ofcom. In the 1980s and 1990s
telecommunications had a new regulator, Oftel, while broadcasting and certain other fields of
communications had their own dedicated regulators with longer histories.
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the sense of share prices being less linked to the underlying economic value brought
about by the proposed mergers..
Conclusions and Discussion
Competition policy can be expected to impact on shareholder value during each stage
of a merger inquiry process. Investors can be expected to reassess the probable final
outcome of the inquiry at each step in the process, repeatedly revising the share prices
of the merging companies. This paper has examined the impact of UK competition
policy on shareholder value based on 50 mergers investigated by the MMC/CC
between 1989 and 2002. The study builds on earlier work on the effects of
competition policy on shareholder value (especially Wier, 1983, Franks and Harris,
1993, Forbes, 1994) and examines whether the regulatory process decreases efficient
market behaviour.
The empirical results support the findings of earlier work in the US and UK regarding
the general level of shareholder value created for the bidder and target companies with
target company shareholders being the main beneficiaries. They also support earlier
findings that, on average, high abnormal losses are incurred by target company
shareholders when a decision is announced by competition authorities prohibiting a
merger. However, taking the regulatory process from initial bid to the MMC/CC’s
final decision, the study does not support the conclusion of Wier (1983) that target
shareholders faced with a prohibition decision make an overall loss. Instead, a small
gain to target company shareholder value is recorded.
UK competition policy has been in existence for over 50 years and while it has gone
through a number of changes, most recently with the Competition Act 1998 and the
Enterprise Act 2002, investors should have developed an understanding of the
likelihood of a referral to the MMC/CC and the likely decision of the Commission.
This understanding will be based on past experience involving similar mergers. It is
likely that with the benefit of experience, investors’ judgements of possible
competition policy outcomes will be reasonably stable. This offers one possible
explanation for the small percentage losses to target company shareholders reported
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by Wier (1983) compared to the results from this study, which found a small gain to
shareholders in target companies. Wier’s study deals with a different competition
regime, that of the US, and perhaps the US stock market had more difficulty in the
period studied in correctly anticipating competition policy decisions.
The results also indicated that mergers involving industries in the water, electricity
and communications industries that were subject to competition inquiries showed less
efficient market behaviour than those in other industries. The explanation for this
possibly lies in the greater uncertainty that surrounded the response of regulators to
mergers in these sectors. The water and electricity sectors had been given a particular
organisational structure at privatisation and it was unclear whether the regulators
would allow this structure to be altered through mergers. The government was known
to take a special interest in the future of communications because of the perceived
importance of this industry for national wellbeing. The ‘privatisation’ cases may have
experienced share price changes that were influenced by inexperience on the part of
investors of the dual regulatory regime that exists for these sectors in the UK,
involving both the MMC/CC and sector-specific regulatory offices. Another possible
explanation relates to the large number of smaller shareholders in privatised firms as a
result of government policy at privatisation. Our research was unable to separate out
these different possible explanations because of the method used.
In summary, the study identifies that where a competition policy regime is stable and
understood, there is no evidence of adverse overall costs due to share price
movements for shareholders of target companies, when a merger bid is taken in its
entirety from announcement to completion. Cases were also tested for evidence of
efficient market behaviour using Propositions 1 and 2. Both Propositions are based on
the assumption of efficient market behaviour and provide a yardstick against which
cases are tested directly. Proposition 1 applies to merger cases where the deal is
prohibited by the regulator or abandoned by the companies, and the overall value
change arising from bid events to the target company, is expected to be zero.
Proposition 2 applies to merger cases where the deal is allowed (but not conditionally
allowed), the overall value change arising from bid events to the target company
being greater than zero. While the “other” industry group cases matched both
propositions, the “privatised” industry group failed to match in about half on the
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cases. This provides evidence that the market behaviour differed between the two
groups. The “other” industry group, operating in the more stable and mature
regulatory regime, showed evidence of efficient market behaviour having taken place.
However the “privatised” industry group with the dual regulatory structure, of which
investors had less experience, showed evidence of less efficient market behaviour.
The evidence is consistent with a stable regulatory regime supporting efficient market
behaviour. The less efficient market behaviour in the “privatised” group could have
resulted from two possible causes. Firstly, investor uncertainty in predicting decisions
of the newer regulatory structure and secondly, the high level of non-institutional
shareholding in privatised companies may have reduced market efficiency. This
finding suggests that where major changes to merger policy are introduced, it is to be
expected that a period of adjustment will follow for investors, during which
experience is being gained, before more efficient market behaviour returns, and
investors, managers and policy makers should be cognisant of this when making
plans.
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Table 1: The Merger Cases Included in the Study
Merger
Outcome Regulatory Decision
Bidder Target
Month and year
of referral to
CC / MMC
Finalised (F),
Finalised before
referral (FBR) or
Withdrawn (W)
Waived through
(T), Allowed (A),
Conditionally
Allowed (C), Laid
Aside (L) or
Prohibited (P)
Conditional
Remedy -
Structural
(S) or
Behavioural
(B) C
o
m
p
et
it
iv
e
b
id
d
in
g
o
cc
u
rr
ed
S
ec
to
r
re
g
u
la
te
d
In
d
u
st
ry
GEC Plessey Jan-1989 F C B
Siemens Plessey Jan-1989 F C B
Coats Viyella Tootal Jun-1989 F C S
Blue Circle Myson Aug-1989 F A C
Yale Valor Myson Aug-1989 W A C
Atlas Copco Desoutter Sep-1989 F A
Kingfisher Dixons Jan-1990 W P
Tate & Lyle Berisford Jun-1990 W L
Glynwed Int Alumasc Grp Jun-1990 W L
Vishay Crystalate Jul-1990 W L C
TT Crystalate Not referred F T C
Tate & Lyle British Sugar Sep-1990 W P C
Assctd British Foods British Sugar Not referred F T C
Unichem Macarthy Sep-1991 W A C
Lloyds Chem Macarthy Oct-1991 F A C
Hillsdown Assctd British Foods Feb-1992 FBR A
Tarmac Steetley Feb-1992 W L C
Redland Steetley Not referred F T C
Allied Lyons Carlsberg Mar-1992 F C B
Lloyds Midland May-1992 W L C
HSBC Midland Not referred F T C
Service Corp Int Plansbrook Group Dec-1994 FBR C S
GEC VSEL Dec-1994 F A C
British Aerospace VSEL Dec-1994 W A C
Lyonaise Northumbria Water Mar-1995 F C B P
PowerGen Midlands Electricity Nov-1995 W P P
National Power Southern Electricity Nov-1995 W P P
GEHE Lloyds Chemists Mar-1996 F C S C
Unichem Lloyds Chemists Mar-1996 W C S C
General Utilities Mid Kent Holding May-1996 W P P
SAUR Mid Kent Holdings May-1996 W P P
Wessex Water South West Water May-1996 W P C P
Severn Trent South West Water May-1996 W P C P
Robert Wiseman Scottish Pride Aug-1996 F C B C
P&O Stena Nov-1996 F C B
Pacificorp Energy Group Jul-1997 W A C P
Texas Utilities Energy Group Not referred F T C P
Tomkins Kerry Apr-1998 FBR C S
BSkyB Manchester United Oct-1998 W P P
Whitbread Allied Domecq Jul-1999 W L C
Vivendi BSkyB Nov-1999 FBR C S P
NTL C&W Communications Nov-1999 F A P
Carlton United News & Media Feb-2000 W C S C
Granada United News & Media Feb-2000 F C S C
Lloyds-TSB Abbey National Feb-2001 W P
Reed Elsevier Harcourt General Feb-2001 F C S
Interbrew Bass Sep-2001 FBR C S
Hilton Grp BSkyB Oct-2001 W L
Group4Falk Wackenhut Corporation May-2002 FBR A
Carlton Granada Mar-2003 F C S
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Table 2: Possible Outcomes following Referral of a Bid to the MMC/CC
Decision of the MMC/CC and the type of remedy prescribed Designation
of the
outcome
The bid is found to have no adverse affects Allowed
The bid is found to have adverse affects and a remedy is prescribed. The
remedy is:
Behavioural (e.g. price control or other operational undertakings) Behavioural
remedy
Structural (e.g. divestment of some assets) Structural
remedy
Prohibition of the merger including de-merging if the merger has been
completed.
Merger
prohibited
The bid is abandoned by the bidding company. Merger laid
aside
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Table 3: Summary of acquisitions and mergers activity 1989 –2002 and
competition inquiry decisions.
1989 –2002 Number % of all
mergers
All acquisitions and mergers:
All mergers1 9872 100
Qualifying cases2 3165 32.1
Referrals made to CC/ MMC2 156 1.6
Decisions made by CC / MMC on referrals:
Adverse finding3 71 0.7
No adverse findings3 61 0.6
Laid aside3 25 0.3
All decisions made by CC / MMC3
157 1.6
Remedies in adverse findings cases
Behavioural3 20 0.2
Structural3 29 0.3
Prohibited3 22 0.2
Sources:
1. Office of Fair Trading: Annual Report: Number of acquisitions of UK companies published in
Acquisitions and Mergers in the UK (pre 1994 but excludes the financial sector) or First Release (1994
and later) by the Office of National Statistics.
2. Office of Fair Trading: Annual Report.
3. Competition Commission: Website http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/: Inquiries
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Table 4: Summary of the Abnormal Returns
Bidder companies Target companies
Overall
CAR
Referral
CAR
Decision
CAR
Overall
CAR
Referral
CAR
Decision
CAR
Cases analysed by Privatised or Other Industry - section A
All cases CAR % 1.0 -0.5 0.3 14.3 -3.5 -0.3
(50 bidder, 37 target companies) z -1.08 -1.76 -1.05 14.80 -12.47 0.95
* *** ***
Privatised Industry cases CAR % -2.9 -2.2 -0.4 8.3 -2.2 -7.1
(12 bidder, 9 target companies) z -2.66 -3.66 -1.65 5.39 -3.44 -12.11
*** *** * *** *** ***
Other Industry cases CAR % 2.2 0.1 0.5 16.2 -3.9 2.0
(38 bidder, 28 target companies) z 0.25 0.06 -0.28 13.95 -12.83 5.90
*** *** ***
Cases analysed by regulatory decision - section B
Allowed
All cases CAR % -1.8 -0.4 0.4 20.7 -9.4 5.1
(11 bidder, 7 target companies) z -0.87 -0.65 0.14 15.67 -22.76 11.93
*** *** ***
Privatised Industry cases CAR % 5.2 -3.0 2.6 8.4 4.3 -6.0
(2 bidder, 1 target companies) z 0.54 -1.54 1.56 0.64 0.72 -1.63
Other Industry cases CAR % -3.3 0.2 -0.1 22.8 -12.2 7.3
(9 bidder, 6 target companies) z -1.22 0.00 -0.58 15.57 -23.41 12.83
*** *** ***
Conditionally Allowed
All cases CAR % 7.1 0.2 0.9 16.4 -1.6 4.7
(17 bidder, 14 target companies) z 1.90 0.39 -0.21 6.52 -1.62 3.15
* *** ***
Privatised Industry cases CAR % 3.6 -0.3 0.2 6.2 -1.7 0.1
(2 bidder, 2 target companies) z 0.70 0.04 0.20 2.82 0.03 0.29
***
Other Industry cases CAR % 7.5 0.3 1.0 18.2 -1.6 5.5
(15 bidder, 12 target companies) z 1.53 0.25 0.02 5.90 -1.76 3.28
*** * ***
Laid aside
All cases CAR % 1.4 -0.1 1.1 6.6 -1.6 -8.1
(7 bidder, 4 target companies) z 0.26 0.14 0.63 1.37 -2.94 -3.18
*** ***
Privatised Industry cases CAR % - - - - - -
(0 bidder, 0 target companies) z - - - - - -
Other Industry cases CAR % 1.4 -0.1 1.1 6.6 -1.6 -8.1
(7 bidder, 4 target companies) z 0.26 0.14 0.63 1.37 -2.94 -3.18
*** ***
Prohibited
All cases CAR % -6.7 -2.0 -1.0 4.8 -3.2 -8.9
(10 bidder, 7 target companies) z -4.30 -3.32 -2.66 2.95 -3.54 -14.28
*** *** *** *** *** ***
Privatised Industry cases CAR % -6.5 -2.8 -1.7 5.4 -3.0 -12.6
(7 bidder, 5 target companies) z -3.80 -3.98 -3.38 2.95 -3.25 -17.00
*** *** *** *** ** ***
Other Industry cases CAR % -7.1 0.1 0.5 3.2 -3.6 0.4
(3 bidder, 2 target companies) z -2.05 0.03 0.30 0.85 -1.49 0.16
**
Waived through
All cases CAR % 1.4 -0.4 -0.7 18.5 -3.6 -2.7
(5 bidder, 5 target companies) z 0.54 -0.43 -0.66 7.29 -1.81 0.17
*** *
Privatised Industry cases CAR % -6.5 -0.0 1.6 27.1 -5.5 5.2
(1 bidder, 1 target company) z -0.90 -0.01 0.73 4.95 -3.81 2.93
*** *** ***
Other Industry cases CAR % 3.4 -0.5 -1.2 16.4 -3.1 -4.6
(4 bidder, 4 target companies) z 1.06 -0.48 -1.10 5.67 -0.12 -1.65
*** *
* significant at the 10% level ** significant at the 5% level *** significant at the 1% level
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Table 5. Results of tests for propositions 1 and 2.
Case (bidder - target)
Total target
abnormal
returns %* Z
Proposition1
For
Prohibited
and Laid
Aside cases
target, AR=0
(Z>1.96)
Proposition 2
For Allowed
and Waived
Thro’ cases
target, AR>0
(Z>1.96)
Privatised Industries
Allowed
NTL - C&W Communications 10.2% 0.68 False
Prohibited
BSkyB - Manchester United 21.4% 3.94 False
General Utilities / SAUR - Mid Kent Holding 3.6% 1.01 True
Wessex Water - South West Water 8.8% 2.30 False
PowerGen - Midlands Electricity -0.8% -0.10 True
National Power - Southern Electricity 2.1% 0.36 True
Waived through
Texas Utilities - Energy Group 28.3% 4.72 True
Other Industries
Allowed
GEC - VSEL 31.7% 3.96 True
Lloyds Chem - Macarthy 31.1% 4.50 True
Atlas Copco - Desoutter 82.1% 22.93 True
Blue Circle - Myson 38.3% 7.21 True
Laid aside
Tate & Lyle - Berisford 7.7% 0.83 True
Glynwed Int - Alumasc Grp 2.9% 0.50 True
Hilton Grp - BSkyB 17.5% 1.71 True
Whitbread - Allied Domecq 14.9% 1.31 True
Prohibited
Lloyds-TSB - Abbey National -6.8% -0.71 True
Kingfisher - Dixons 16.6% 2.01 False
Waived through
Redland - Steetley 70.4% 4.57 True
HSBC - Midland 73.6% 6.11 True
TT - Crystalate 37.9% 2.04 True
* Percentage ARs are based on total currency abnormal returns for bid specific events as a percentage
of the share price two days before bid announcement.
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Table 6: Summary of the Results in Table 5 for Propositions 1 & 2
(p- value = 0.101 (two sided)
The difference between the ‘Other Industries’ and the ‘Privatised Industries’ groups is significant at the 10% level using Fisher’s Exact Test.
True or False results Privatised
Industries
Other
Industries
Total
TRUE 4 12 16
FALSE 3 1 4
Total 13 7 20
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Referred to MMC/CC for in ves tigation
Merger deal announced
Public interes t tes t prior to
June 2002: now subs tantial
lessening of com petition
tes t. Ad verse effects
suspected?
Figure 1
Flow Chart of the UK Merger Referral and
Inquiry Process showing Main Decision Events.
MMC/CC
recommend
behavioural
rem edy *
MMC/CC
recommend
structural
rem edy *
MMC/CC
recommend
prohibition *
MMC/CC
find no
adverse
effects *
OFT m onitor deal
Merger laid
as ide by
applicants
Merger proceeds Merger deal
terminated
No
Yes
Rem edy
agreed?Yes No
* Before 2002 if the Minis ter disagreed with an adverse decis ion by MMC/CC, he/she could reject the
findings or apply a different rem edy. Since June 2002 the CC decis ion and decis ion on rem edies is
normally final.
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